Creativity training in causal inference using the idea post-exposure paradigm: Effects on idea generation in junior high school students  by Sannomiya, Machiko & Yamaguchi, Yosuke
Thinking Skills and Creativity 22 (2016) 152–158
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Thinking  Skills  and  Creativity
j o ur na l ho me  pag e: h t tp : / /www.e lsev ier .com/ locate / tsc
Creativity  training  in  causal  inference  using  the  idea
post-exposure  paradigm:  Effects  on  idea  generation  in  junior
high  school  students
Machiko  Sannomiya ∗,  Yosuke  Yamaguchi
Osaka University, 1-2 Yamadaoka, Suita, Osaka 565-0871, Japan
a  r  t  i c  l  e  i  n  f  o
Article history:
Received 15 September 2015
Received in revised form 8 September 2016
Accepted 16 September 2016
Available online 21 September 2016
Keywords:
Creativity training
Idea generation
Causal inference
Metacognitive belief
Idea post-exposure paradigm
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
In the present  study, an  experiment  was  performed  to  examine  the  effects  of  training  in
creative  causal  inference  using  a repeated  idea  post-exposure  (IPE)  paradigm  on  the  ability
of  junior  high  school  students  to  generate  ideas.  The  essential  components  of  the  training
were  as  follows:  1) repeated  practice  in  causal  inference,  2)  post  exposure  to others’  ideas,
and 3) the  use  of  various  everyday  problems.  The  results  showed  that  participants  in the
training  condition  exhibited  a general  increase  in  the number  of ideas  and  their  categories.
Their  ratings  revealed  that they  explicitly  recognized  the  effect  of training  on  their idea
generation  and  attitudes  about  thinking.  They  positively  evaluated  the  aforementioned
three  essential  components.  They  also  reported  that improvements  in  their  ability  and
persistence  in idea  generation  through  this training,  which  suggests  that  they  acquired  the
metacognitive  belief  that  creative  thinking  ability  can  be enhanced  with  training.  Future
work  should  examine  the  effects  of IPE  and  repeated  practice  separately,  and  how  training
is affected  by  the quantity  and  quality  of the  ideas  to which  participants  are  exposed.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
In order to solve the many problems we face in daily life, we have to think of their causes from various angles. For example,
when Jim does not appear at the appointed place at the promised time, you wonder, “Why doesn’t Jim come?” What should
you do if you cannot reach him on his mobile phone? If you attribute his failure to appear to his personality and conclude
that he easily breaks his promises, you may  become disappointed and leave the place, although Jim may  have forgotten his
mobile phone at home and is waiting for you nearby, but in the wrong place.Regarding the ﬁrst cause of an event that comes to your mind as the only correct one may  impede problem-solving. Flexible
thinking is required for inferring various causes. Indeed, one of the bases of human sciences, including psychology, is the
recognition that a single outcome can have multiple causes. The attitude to think of potential causes creatively (ﬂuently
and ﬂexibly) is crucial for scientiﬁc explorations of human cognition, affect, and behavior. Creative causal inference can
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grateful  to Mr.  Yasuhira Yamaguchi and other teachers of the junior high school afﬁliated with the Faculty of Education of Wakayama University for their
assistance. We would also like to acknowledge the anonymous reviewers for their helpful and constructive comments on our earlier version of this paper.
A  part of the data present in this paper was ﬁrst presented at the 79th Conference of the Japanese Psychological Association (Nagoya, July 2015).
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: sannomiya@hus.osaka-u.ac.jp (M.  Sannomiya), y-yamaguchi@hus.osaka-u.ac.jp (Y. Yamaguchi).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tsc.2016.09.006
1871-1871/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
i
w
c
c
a
i
a
c
s
a
b
g
a
i
t
a
f
h
t
i
t
c
s
d
p
o
e
t
f
c
t
w
E
n
t
t
u
(
c
i
i
p
o
t
w
w
e
c
p
n
c
e
g
t
t
s
wM. Sannomiya, Y. Yamaguchi / Thinking Skills and Creativity 22 (2016) 152–158 153
mprove problem-solving and therefore is desirable for not only researchers but also the public. Although causal thinking
ould require convergent thinking, it needs divergent (creative) thinking at the ﬁrst stage, because in order to identify a
ause adequately, one should ﬁrst consider various possible causes (i.e., creative causal inference). We  focused on creative
ausal inference in the present study.
Creative causal inference is difﬁcult for most people as education has so far been inadequate in fostering the ability and
ttitude it requires. First, biased beliefs about creative thinking are deeply rooted, and these beliefs lead to an attitude that
s not conducive for creative thinking. Weisberg (1986) pointed out myths regarding creativity such as “creative individuals
re capable of extraordinary thought processes” and “creative individuals are assumed to possess extraordinary personality
haracteristics” (p. 1); in other words, creativity is remarkable talent. Creativity myths are widely held among university
tudents (Agata & Okada, 2009) and working people (Basadur & Hausdorf, 1996; Basadur, Taggar, & Pringle, 1999). Yamaguchi
nd Sannomiya (2012) investigated beliefs about creativity among Japanese university students and the inﬂuence of such
eliefs on attitudes toward creative thinking. The results indicated that a talent orientation (e.g., “Talent is essential to
enerate creative ideas”) was negatively associated with originality and ﬂexibility. The belief that creativity is an innate
nd stable trait may  lead to the negative view that it is impossible for oneself to generate creative ideas and may  thus
nterfere with the attempt to see a problem from various perspectives. In contrast, a belief that one can develop creative
hinking ability by one’s own efforts was positively associated with persistence, inquisitiveness, curiosity, ﬂexibility, and
ggressiveness. These ﬁndings suggest that fostering a creative thinking attitude requires changes in metacognitive beliefs,
rom nativism to acquirerism. In other words, people need to believe that creative thinking can be improved. If training can
ave an effect on creativity, this is evidence for acquirerism. Thus, recognizing the positive effects of training on creative
hinking ability may  lead to changes in metacognitive beliefs. On the basis of the viewpoint that creative thinking can be
mproved by training, the present study aims to develop a method for creativity training in causal inference and to examine
he effects of such training. If the trainees recognize their improvement after the training, they will come to believe that
reative thinking ability can be trained and they will try to improve their own  ability subsequently.
Although training in creative thinking has not been actively conducted in conventional school education, a number of
tudies suggest that it may  be effective. Glover (1980) trained 14 undergraduates over 20 sessions of exercises that involved
evising unusual uses of everyday objects and problem solving. Participants in both the training and control conditions
erformed pre- and post-tests including the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT). Scores on ﬂuency, ﬂexibility, and
riginality showed a signiﬁcant increase in the training group, but not in the control group. Clapham (1997) examined the
ffectiveness of a creativity training program for 108 undergraduates. The program included listing as many ideas as possible
o improve a bathtub, learning about the deﬁnition of creativity and idea-generating techniques, and discussing personal
actors affecting successful performance. TTCT-Figural scores were higher for participants in the training condition than the
ontrol condition. Benedek, Fink, and Neubauer (2006) examined the effectiveness of a computer-based divergent thinking
raining program for 36 participants who were 19 to 51 years old. The program consisted of exercises such as generating
ords beginning with the syllable DE, creating slogans for a new product of orange ice, and generating words using the letters
NGLAND. Effects of training were analyzed using the VKT (Verbaler Kreativitäts-Test), a German creativity test comprising
ine subscales. Participants in the training condition scored higher than those in the control condition on ideational ﬂuency,
hough this difference marginally failed to reach signiﬁcance. Fink, Grabner, Benedek, and Neubauer (2006) used the same
raining program as Benedek et al. (2006) and reported similar results. Stevenson, Kleibeuker, De Dreu, and Crone (2014)
sed tasks such as devising new uses for objects, in a creativity training program for students (13–16 years old) and adults
20–30 years old), and reported that the program had larger effects on the younger participants. This ﬁnding indicates that
reativity training may  improve causal inference among junior high school students.
A potentially useful technique in creativity training is exposure to others’ ideas. We know from experience in brainstorm-
ng situations that exposure to others’ ideas stimulates our own  idea generation. However, in brainstorming-like situations,
t is difﬁcult to control confounding factors in order to verify the effectiveness of exposure to others’ ideas. Even if it were
ossible to control the combination of participants and their knowledge and involvement in the brainstorming problem,
ther factors such as the sequence of utterances or the development of discussion would remain uncontrollable. To avoid
his problem, an idea exposure paradigm can provide pseudo-situations of brainstorming that do not require interactions
ith others. Dugosh and Paulus (2005), Valacich, Jung, and Looney (2006), and Fink et al. (2012) conducted experiments in
hich participants were exposed to examples of ideas while they generated ideas. For instance, each time the participant
ntered an idea into the computer, an idea appeared on the monitor. In these studies, participants were given no score for
reative performance if they generated ideas that had been presented as examples. Nevertheless, participants did sometimes
roduce the same ideas as the examples, and it could not be determined whether the participants were coincidentally (i.e.,
ot deliberately) generating ideas that were similar to the examples or merely repeating ideas that they were shown. In
ontrast to these studies, Sannomiya, Shimamune, and Morita (2000) employed a method that can be called an idea post-
xposure (IPE) paradigm. In this method, participants (undergraduates) were exposed to others’ ideas after they ﬁnished
enerating their own ideas, instead of the usual idea exposure paradigm. The use of this paradigm enabled the researchers
o distinguish between each participant’s own ideas and the other ideas that participant was exposed to. The results showed
hat this training method was effective for increasing the number of ideas generated by the participants.
The creative thinking tasks typically used in the idea exposure paradigm are predicting results and devising new uses or
olutions, but not inferring causes. Examples are the “thumbs problem,” in which participants listed the consequences that
ould arise if everyone born after 2000 had an extra thumb on each hand (Dugosh & Paulus, 2005); devising unusual uses
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Table 1
Examples of ideas post-exposed in the training session.
Question: “On the ﬁnal, Taro scored more than 50 points lower than he did on the midterm. What caused this? List as many ideas as possible.”
1. Reading comics robbed him of studying time.
2.  He studied while watching TV.
3.  The test was harder than the midterm.
4.  The teacher gave tricky problems.
5.  Because he had a pain in his stomach and went to the restroom, he didn’t have enough time to solve the problems.
6.  Because he was sleepy during the test, he fell asleep before he solved all the problems.
7.  The teacher who  yelled at him in the morning was the test proctor, so he couldn’t concentrate on the test.
8.  He was worried about losing his wallet somewhere.
for conventional objects, such as pen or umbrella (Fink et al., 2012); and solution-invention tasks with topics like “What
can people do to help preserve the environment?” (Nijstad, Stroebe, & Lodewijkx, 2002, p. 538) and “How can we  improve
parking at the university?” (Valacich et al., 2006; p. 5). Research using causal inference tasks is scarce, though Sannomiya
et al. (2000) used a task in the IPE paradigm that required participants to generate as many causal inferences as possible
about everyday events, for example, “A woman cooked curry as she usually does, but it did not taste as good as usual. Why?”
The present study is based on the viewpoint that creative causal inference is an ability that is important in daily life, as
mentioned previously. It aims to determine an effective way of training this ability. We expected that exposure to others’
ideas, as in brainstorming, would be effective. We  therefore modiﬁed the brainstorming method such that it could be per-
formed without others’ presence. Furthermore, although ordinary brainstorming is a one-time activity, the present training
involved repetitions with different problems. We  used the IPE of Sannomiya et al. (2000) to conduct creativity training in
causal inference for junior high school students. The training included 10 sessions in causal inference with various problems.
After inference generation, the participants were exposed to others’ inferences. The repetitive exposure over the series of
sessions was expected to stimulate idea generation from both cognitive and motivational aspects. The participants could
not copy the ideas they were exposed to because they had ﬁnished their own idea generation before the exposure and
all problems were different. We  compared ﬂuency and ﬂexibility of idea generation between an experimental (training)
condition and a control condition. We  also analyzed participants’ subjective ratings and reﬂections on the training.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Participants were 100 ninth-grade students from a school that was afﬁliated to a national university in Japan. Four
classes were randomly assigned to two groups. Forty-nine students (19 boys and 30 girls) were assigned to the experimental
condition, and 51 students (19 boys and 32 girls) were assigned to the control condition. Participants in the control condition
received no training.
2.2. Experimental design
The experiment used a pre/post design. The independent variable was the presence of the training. The dependent
variables were the number of ideas (index of ideational ﬂuency) and the number of categories of ideas (index of ideational
ﬂexibility) produced in the posttest. We  also analyzed subjective evaluations and written reﬂections about the training from
the participants in the experimental condition.
2.3. Materials
We  used ten problems for the training session, one problem for the pretest, and two  problems for the posttest. In the
posttest, one problem was the same as that presented in the pretest (posttest-old) and one problem was  new (posttest-new).
In addition, for each problem in the training session, we prepared eight ideas as examples of causal inference (Table 1), and
these were presented to the participants in the experimental condition.
2.4. Procedure
The experiment was conducted in groups over three days. On Day 1, all participants underwent the pretest, presented in a
booklet. Subsequently, only the participants in the experimental condition underwent ﬁve training sessions. On Day 2, they
underwent another ﬁve sessions. On Day 3, all participants underwent the posttest. In the training sessions, participants
were requested to generate as many ideas as possible for a causal inference problem within a 6-min time limit. They
were then exposed to eight examples for 2 min. After the posttest, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire
about the training (Table 4), which employed a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all;  5 = very much). The questionnaire also
asked participants to reﬂect on the training (free description). After the experiment, compensatory creativity training was
provided for participants in the control condition.
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Table  2
Examples of the ideas generated by one participant in the experimental condition.
Question: “Ken doesn’t seem to concentrate on soccer training, though he always practices very hard. What caused this? List as many
ideas  as possible.”
Pretest Posttest-old
1. He felt uneasy because he quarreled with his friends. 1. He felt ill.
2.  He got a bad score on a test. 2. He got a bad score on a test.
3.  He has felt ill since this morning. 3. It was hot.
4.  He didn’t feel like playing soccer. 4. He did something his mother scolded him for.
5.  It was so hot that he wasn’t motivated to do anything. 5. The girl he liked passed by.
6.  After practice, he had to go to the cram school and take a test. 6. He quarreled with his friends.
7. After this, he had to go to cram school.
8.  He heard an animal making noises somewhere.
9.  He was hungry.
10. The scenery appeared to be different from usual.
11. He wanted to watch TV.
12. He had something to do that day.
13. His friend who  always played soccer with him was absent that day.
14.  He was thirsty.
15. He wanted to study.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics for pretest and posttest.
Pretest M (SD) Posttest-old M (SD) Posttest-new M (SD)
Number of ideas Experimental condition 10.02 (3.36) 14.14 (4.96) 12.74 (5.15)
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tControl condition 10.86 (3.29) 13.16 (2.85) 11.43 (3.70)
Number of categories of ideas Experimental condition 4.82 (1.92) 6.22 (2.08) 7.84 (2.28)
Control condition 5.00 (1.71) 5.86 (1.65) 6.92 (1.68)
. Results
Examples of the ideas that one participant in the experimental condition generated in the pretest and the posttest-old
re shown in Table 2.
.1. Effects on ideational ﬂuency and ideational ﬂexibility
.1.1. Ideational ﬂuency in causal inference problems
Each participant’s ideational ﬂuency was measured by the number of all non-redundant ideas he or she generated.
escriptive statistics for the pretest and the posttests are shown in Table 3. To determine the effect of training on ideational
uency, a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was conducted using the posttest scores as the dependent vari-
ble and the pretest score as a covariate. The MANCOVA (Pillai’s trace) showed a signiﬁcant effect of training on overall
deational ﬂuency, F (2, 96) = 4.09, p < 0.05, p2 = 0.08. A univariate analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) showed that training
ad a signiﬁcant effect on both posttest-old performance, F (1, 97) = 5.16, p < 0.05, p2 = 0.05, and posttest-new performance,
 (1, 97) = 7.38, p < 0.01, p2 = 0.07.
.1.2. Ideational ﬂexibility in causal inference problems
Ideational ﬂexibility was measured by the number of different categories of ideas generated by a participant. Four inde-
endent raters, who were not informed of the conditions, classiﬁed each idea according to a coding schema created by the
uthors. To determine the reliability of coding, another rater coded a random sample of approximately 25% of the ideas coded
y each of the aforementioned ﬁrst raters. Inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s ) was  satisfactory (0.72–0.85 for the pretest and
he posttest-old and 0.73–0.90 for the posttest-new). Therefore we decided to adopt the classiﬁcations from the ﬁrst raters
n the data analyses.
Descriptive statistics for the pretest and the posttests are shown in Table 3. To determine the effects of training on
deational ﬂexibility, a MANCOVA was conducted using the posttest scores as the dependent variable and the pretest score as
 covariate. The MANCOVA (Pillai’s trace) showed a signiﬁcant effect of training on overall ideational ﬂexibility, F (2, 96) = 3.43,
 < 0.05, p2 = 0.07. A univariate ANCOVA showed that training had a signiﬁcant effect on posttest-new performance, F (1,
7) = 6.75, p < 0.05, p2 = 0.07, but not on posttest-old performance, F (1, 97) = 1.75, n.s.,  p2 = 0.02..2. Ratings and reﬂections about the training
Questionnaire ratings are shown in Table 4. Participants did not highly rate item 8, which asked about prior experience in
hinking about “Why?” (M = 3.14). This result provides evidence that the current school education does not contain enough
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Table 4
Ratings about the training.
Items M SD
1. It was fun to take this training in causal inference. 3.51 1.12
2.  During the training, I was inspired in a way  I haven’t experienced before. 3.80 0.98
3.  With the training, I became more persistent in my thinking. 3.80 0.89
4.  Thinking about various problems helped me  develop the ability to generate ideas. 3.96 0.87
5.  Repeated exercises helped me  develop the ability to generate ideas. 3.65 0.95
6.  Learning about others’ ideas after thinking on my  own helped me come up with various ideas. 4.29 0.89
7.  Learning about others’ ideas after thinking on my  own motivated me to think more about different problems. 3.25 1.13
8.  I have had the experience of thinking about “Why?” from various perspectives, as in this training, in everyday life or in a class. 3.14 1.04
Table 5
Percentage of reﬂections about the training in various categories.
Category Percentage
Actual feeling of developing one’s own ideational ability or persistence 47.73%
Positive evaluation of idea post-exposure paradigm 36.36%
Experience of fun or interest 27.27%
Motivation to apply learnings in daily life or other contexts 25.00%
Recognition of the importance of thinking ﬂexibly 20.45%
lessons in which students must consider causes from diverse perspectives. The participants highly evaluated the effectiveness
of the present training. The mean score for item 6, which asked about the effectiveness of the IPE paradigm (“Learning about
others’ ideas after thinking on my  own helped me  come up with various ideas”) was  the highest (M = 4.29) among the items.
This indicates that the participants explicitly considered the IPE paradigm effective in developing their ideational ability.
Similarly, participants highly rated item 4 (“Thinking about various problems helped me  develop the ability to generate
ideas”: M = 3.96) and item 5 (“Repeated exercises helped me  develop the ability to generate ideas”: M = 3.65). These results
indicate that the participants recognized that repeated practice with various problems could foster ideational ability.
We calculated the mean score of items 2, 4, 5, and 6, which reﬂected participants’ actual perceptions that their performance
and ability on creative thinking were developed (M = 3.92, SD = 0.68,  = 0.74) and compared it with the theoretical median
(3: neither). A one-sample t-test showed that the score was  signiﬁcantly higher than the theoretical median, t (48) = 9.52,
p < 0.001, d = 1.91. We  also calculated the mean score of items 1, 3, and 7, which reﬂect a positive attitude toward creative
thinking (M = 3.52, SD = 0.78,  = 0.74). A one-sample t-test showed that the score was signiﬁcantly higher than the theoretical
median, t (48) = 4.63, p < 0.001, d = 0.93.
Analysis of the participants’ reﬂections (free description) revealed the following themes: 1) actual feelings of developing
their own ideational ability or persistence, 2) positive evaluations of the IPE paradigm, 3) experience of fun or interest,
4) motivation to apply learnings in daily life or other contexts, and 5) recognition of the importance of thinking ﬂexibly
(Table 5). Data of ﬁve participants who reported nothing were excluded from the analysis.
4. Discussion
4.1. Causal inference performance and subjective evaluation
The present experiment examined the effect of creativity training in causal inference, using the repeated IPE paradigm
with various everyday problems. The number of ideas generated increased in both old and new posttests, and the number
of categories of ideas increased in the new posttest. These results together show that the current form of training improved
ﬂuency and ﬂexibility in causal inference.
In the questionnaire, most of the participants reported improvements in their ability for and attitude toward creative
thinking. These subjective ratings are in line with the objective results reported above. As shown in Table 5, the highest
rankings were assigned to actual feelings of developing personal ideational ability or persistence, positive evaluations of the
IPE paradigm, and experiences of fun or interest. In addition, participants reported motivation to apply what they learned
to daily life or other contexts (e.g., “I shall infer the causes of whatever occurs in my  life”) as well as recognition of the
importance of thinking ﬂexibly (e.g., “Though I have previously been satisﬁed with ﬁnding only one cause, I feel that I can
now detect multiple causes by considering things from a variety of perspectives”). These reﬂections show that participants
became aware of the effectiveness and importance of this training.
It is noteworthy that training not only increase participants’ objective performance in ideational ﬂuency and ideational
ﬂexibility but also give them the feeling that they are developing their own creative thinking ability. Training should lead to a
positive change in beliefs about creative thinking, prompting participants to shift their metacognitive beliefs about creative
thinking from nativism to acquirerism.
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.2. The underlying mechanisms of the effect of the training
The mechanism underlying the effect of causal inference training using the IPE paradigm is not yet clear, though the
resent study provides evidence of the effect. We  consider that this training effect is based on cognitive and motivational
timulation through exposure to others’ ideas like in brainstorming situations (Dugosh, Paulus, Roland, & Yang, 2000).
lthough few studies have discussed the mechanisms underlying creativity training, Clapham (1997) mentioned possible
echanisms of the effect of creativity training. Cropley and Cropley (2000) summarized the main points of these mechanisms
s follows: “(a) development of appropriate thinking skills; (b) acquisition of positive attitudes to creativity and creative
erformance; (c) motivation to be creative; (d) perception of oneself as capable of being creative; (e) reduction of anxiety
bout creativity; and (f) experience of positive mood in problem-solving situations” (p. 209). These mechanisms can be
ssumed to have been present in the current training program. The subjective ratings and reﬂections of the experimental
roup indicated that the participants recognized the improvement in their creative thinking skills and attitudes, and that
hey acquired self-efﬁcacy of becoming more creative. In other words, they acquired positive metacognitive beliefs. This
ay  have increased their motivation and ultimately resulted in better performance in the posttest.
Furthermore, in this training program, the time for generating ideas was  limited to 6 min. Considering the time required
o write down their ideas, the participants had to think quickly in order to generate many causal inferences within the time
imit. This time pressure might contribute to making the training more effective.
As for interpretation of the present effect, we could point out three issues. (1) As the training included two  factors of
epeated practice and IPE, the effect of individual factors was not examined. That is, we  cannot refute the possibility that
ust one of these factors was solely responsible for the training effects observed. The two factors need to be separately
nvestigated in the future. (2) It is not clear whether the present training is more effective for enhancing causal inference
bility than the training with more typical problems such as devising alternative uses. It might be possible that the effect
f typical divergent thinking training will transfer to causal inference. However, we consider that causal inference training
s desirable, because it would more directly make participants aware of the importance of generating various causes (i.e.,
ivergent thinking in causal inference) and the interest in it. Such awareness is important to foster the creative attitude
owards causal inference, and it was supported by the reﬂections from the participants. As for this issue, it needs to be
onﬁrmed in further studies with adding a control condition in which participants are provided with more typical divergent
hinking problems. (3) The results could be biased by experimenter effects (expectancy effects), as the trainer expected an
ffect to occur in the experimental condition. As Stevenson et al. (2014) found no effect in their training which required to
evise alternative uses of such as compact discs, the training effect is difﬁcult to be attributed to the trainer’s expectation.
evertheless, we must keep expectancy effects in mind when interpreting the current results.
.3. Issues concerning quantity and quality of exposed ideas
We  would like to discuss the quantity and quality of ideas participants were exposed to. We  presented eight ideas as
xamples of causal inference for each problem in the training. It is not clear how the number of ideas to which participants
ere exposed inﬂuenced the results. Dugosh and Paulus (2005) examined how idea generation was  inﬂuenced by the
umber of ideas participants were exposed to. Using a one-shot intervention rather than repeated training, they found that
articipants presented with 40 ideas generated more ideas than participants presented with 8 ideas. In contrast, Agogué
t al. (2014) reported that presentation of just one idea improved idea generation. To date, no study has examined the effect
f the number of ideas to which participants are exposed, especially for repeated training. This topic needs to be examined.
In this experiment, we did not evaluate the quality of the ideas participants were exposed to. As shown in Table 1, we used
ather common ideas and not particularly unique ones. It is not clear which of the two, exposure of unique ideas or common
deas, is more effective in training. Research using the conventional idea exposure paradigm has inconsistent results in this
egard. In the experiment of Fink et al. (2012), the facilitation effect of unique ideas was similar in magnitude to that of
ommon ideas. In the study by Dugosh and Paulus (2005), common ideas had a more facilitative effect than unique ideas
mong participants who were exposed to 40 ideas, while the opposite result was  obtained among participants exposed to
nly 8 ideas. Agogué et al. (2014) found that participants exposed to a unique idea generated a larger number of original
deas than participants exposed to a common idea. Valacich et al. (2006) reported that the presentation of unique ideas led
o an increase in the number of high-quality ideas among only participants with high cognitive abilities. Thus, it remains
ncertain how the quality of exposed ideas is related to the training effect. Future studies should examine how the training
ffect is inﬂuenced by the quantity and the quality of ideas to which participants are exposed in the IPE paradigm.
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